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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-2363
SEE EK GO; WIDYANI SUWITA,
                                               Petitioners
   v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES,
                                              Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency Nos. A95-378-469 and A95-378-470)
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 11, 2007
Before: McKEE, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.




 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final orders of removal pursuant to 81
U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Where, as here, the BIA affirms without opinion the IJ’s decision, we
review the IJ’s decision.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
We apply the “extremely deferential” substantial evidence standard to the findings of fact. 
Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). We reverse the BIA’s determinations
only if “the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Abdille v.
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001).  
2
MCKEE, Circuit Judge:
See Ek Go and Widyani Suwita petition for review of a decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of their requests for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”).  Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision, we will deny the
petition for review.1
I.
The Attorney General may grant asylum to aliens who are “refugees.”  See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1).  Generally, a refugee is someone who demonstrates an inability or
unwillingness to return to their prior country of residence “because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution” on account of one of five statutorily protected grounds.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  Past persecution requires proof of “(1) one or more incidents
rising to the level of persecution; (2) that is ‘on account of’ one of the statutorily-protected
grounds; and (3) is committed either by the government or by forces that the government is
either unable or unwilling to control.”  Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir.
32003).  “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment
our society regards as offensive.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir.1993).  Rather,
it encompasses only grave harms such as “threats to life, confinement, torture, and
economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Id. at
1240.  A showing of past persecution gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i).  
The Attorney General must grant withholding of removal if he “decides that the
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened” in the country of removal because of one of
the five protected grounds.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The alien bears the burden of
proving likelihood of persecution.  See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).  
See Ek Go, a native Christian Indonesian of Chinese descent, came to the United
States in November of 1998 because of an economic crisis and related upheaval in
Indonesia.  During the riots of that year, property in petitioners’ store was stolen and
damaged.  See Ek Go was also asked at various times for “protection” money.  He testified
generally that conditions are not favorable for ethnic Chinese and/or Christians in
Indonesia.  He does not believe he will be able to successfully operate a business in
Indonesia and fears the repeat of past incidents.
As noted by the IJ, persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society
regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful.  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Based on the IJ’s review of all the evidence, including Department of State Country
4Reports, he further concluded that no finding could be made that Indonesia engaged in
organized or systemic persecution of Chinese Christians.  See also Lie v. Ashcroft, 396
F.3d 530, 536–38 (3d Cir. 2005).  Similarly, the record does not allow us to conclude that
the IJ erred in concluding that the petitioners failed to establish that they have endured
persecution, or that they have established a well founded fear of future persecution.
Accordingly, the IJ did not err in denying either asylum or withholding of removal. 
Petitioners’ brief does not provide any separate analysis of their CAT claim.  Based
on our review of the record, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Petitioners have not shown they are more likely than not to be tortured upon their return to
Indonesia.  See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Accordingly, we must deny this petition for review.  
